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FIDUCIARY PROVISIONS OF THE EMPLOYEE
RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF
1974
John J. Weiler*
INTRODUCTION
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA)' is an extremely complex arid massive piece of legis-
lation whose full impact has yet to be realized. Its complexity
is attributable in no small part to the dual jurisdiction allo-
cated between the Labor Department and the Treasury De-
partment and its many substantive and procedural provi-
sions. Its mass is attributable to its breadth of coverage, from
a small, fully-insured medical hospitalization plan to a com-
plicated, union-negotiated pension plan. Literally, upon es-
tablishing any employee fringe benefit plan, ERISA applies
from inception to termination.
The fiduciary provisions of ERISA are among the most
complicated portions of the Act. These provisions range from
abstract skeletal principles that necessitate future regula-
tions and court interpretations to specific rules of prohibited
and mandatory conduct. Most fiduciary provisions are not
clearly illuminated or organized in the legislation but must be
extracted by cutting and pasting; their full import and impact
will only be realized with the passage of time.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FIDUCIARY PROVISIONS
The private pension system is of relatively recent origin
in the United States. It is in large part attributable to the
change in our society from a rural agrarian to a highly indus-
trialized urban one. In an industrial society, the laborer sells
his services in return for wages, and when he is no longer
able to sell those services he is forced to live off the wages
previously earned and saved. It was thus only natural for
laborers to be concerned with deferring some of their current
* Member, New Orleans Bar.
1. P.L. 93-406 (September 2, 1974) [hereinafter cited as ERISA]. For a
complete legislative history, see CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, Li-
BRARY OF CONGRESS, HD 7100, 74-183 Ed. (1974).
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wages to their retirement years. The inability of a substantial
portion of the American workers to provide for their own
retirement through savings and the inadequacy of the
amounts saved and the consequences flowing from this result
was one of the prime reasons for the federal government's
injecting itself into the retirement picture. In 1935, Congress
enacted the Federal Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insur-
ance Program, which has been expanded both in coverage and
in benefits in subsequent years. 2 Though the federal govern-
ment had entered into the retirement picture through the
enactment of a federal retirement system, 3 it had, before the
enactment of ERISA, exercised relatively little control over
private pension systems.
The growth in private pension plans in the United States
has been tremendous. In 1950, it was estimated that 9.8 mil-
lion workers were covered by some form of private pension
plan.4 In 1960, the figure had increased to over 21 million, and
by 1969, over 29 million workers were covered.5 It was esti-
mated that in 1974 over 30 million workers, almost one-half of
the private non-farm working force, were covered by some
form of private pension plan.6 The phenomenal rate of expan-
sion in coverage was also matched by the accumulation of
pension assets. In 1974, it was estimated that assets in excess
of 372 billion dollars were held as reserve in various pension
plans.7 These assets constituted the largest unregulated
source of capital in the United States. In view of these fac-
tors, it was only a matter of time before encompassing federal
regulatory legislation was enacted in the private pension
area.
On March 28, 1962, President John F. Kennedy estab-
lished a blue-ribbon federal cabinet-level committee to review
2. 49 Stat. 620; 42 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
3. Id.
4. INTERIM REPORT OF ACTIVITIES OF THE PRIVATE WELFARE AND PEN-
SION PLAN STUDY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON LABOR, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, S. REP. No. 92634, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11,
Table 7 (1972).
5. Id.
6. H. REP. No. 93-533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 259 (1974).
7. 34 SEC STATISTICAL BULLETIN no. 12 (Dec. 1975). Included in this
figure are the assets of private pension plans, state and local government
retirement funds, and pension funds administered by the federal govern-
ment. Total assets of private noninsured pension funds at the end of 1974
were $133.7 billion (book value).
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"the implications of the growing retirement and welfare
funds for the financial structure of the economy, as well as...
review ... the role and character of the private pension and
other retirement systems in the economic security of the na-
tion, and . . . [consider] . . . how they may contribute more
effectively to efficient manpower utilization and mobility. '"8 In
January, 1965, the committee presented its massive report to
President Lyndon B. JohnsonY The legislative recommenda-
tions of the committee were the foundation for substantive
provisions of ERISA. In fact, the major recommendations of
the committee, except for portability of pension benefits, were
enacted into law through ERISA, with some modifications. 10
The Cabinet committee found that private retirement
plans had a major impact on the nation's economy and tax
base, and found major areas of deficiency in the private pen-
sion system.1 ' In turning to the fiduciary area, the committee
indicated that the real problem was not the lack of an approp-
riate fiduciary standard but rather the enforcement of that
standard by and in behalf of participants and the disclosure
to those participants of their rights and benefits.' 2 The com-
mittee found that generally, the standard of fiduciary conduct
established by custom and law in the private trust area was
adequate and adaptable to the private pension area. It did
8. Memorandum from President John F. Kennedy to the Secretary of
Labor, Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman of the
Council of Economic Advisors, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, and the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, titled In Re the Establishment of a Committee on Corporate
Pension Funds and Other Private Retirement and Welfare Programs, March
28, 1962.
9. PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAMS, A REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT ON PRIVATE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PLANS BY PRESIDENT'S
COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE RETIRE-
MENT AND WELFARE PROGRAMS (Jan. 1965).
10. Id. at ix, xi-xii.
11. Id. at xv. The committee indicated that $6 billion are contributed
annually to qualified pension plans, and since these amounts are deducted by
the employer on his tax return and not taxed as current compensation to
plan participants, the government is in fact subsidizing private pension
plans. A Qualified Pension Trust is not a taxable entity and thus earnings
accumulate tax free, which is a loss of revenue for the federal government.
12. Id. at 73. The committee felt that the general standard of fiduciary
conduct in the private trust area, with its long and established history, was
well suited and viable for the pension area.
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recognize that certain accepted and widely used practices
that did not necessarily violate traditional trust law were not
in the best interest of plan participants and should be prohi-
bited.
The Cabinet committee found a deficiency in disclosure to
plan participants of their rights and benefits and the estab-
lishing of effective measures for the enforcement of plan par-
ticipants' rights. In reviewing existing legislation, the com-
mittee came to the conclusion that it was deficient in this
regard and specifically recommended that the Welfare and
Pension Plan Disclosure Act be amended in order to require
fuller disclosure to plan participants.13
Though the Cabinet committee found a deficiency in
existing disclosure requirements it concluded that disclosure
to plan participants in and of itself is not sufficient unless
effective means are established to protect the rights of plan
participants and provide methods for enforcing them. It also
indicated that it may be necessary to designate or create a
federal regulatory agency as guardian for the collective in-
terest of plan participants and their beneficiaries and to em-
power that agency with the necessary authority to bring
court proceedings to enforce those rights.14
Most of the committee recommendations lay relatively
dormant until March 1, 1971, when the United States Senate
passed a resolution directing the Subcommittee on Labor of
the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare to "conduct a
general study of pension and welfare funds with special em-
phasis on the need for protection of employees' coverage." 15
The Subcommittee thoroughly investigated the private pen-
sion field and wrote a lengthy Committee Report concluding
with certain recommendations and legislative proposals.' 6
13. Id. at 78. The committee recommended amending the Welfare and
Pension Plans Disclosure Act to require disclosure of additional information
similar to what is required of investment companies under S.E.C. regula-
tions.
14. Id. at 77. The committee pointed out that full disclosure of all rele-
vant facts to plan participants is a prerequisite to self-help. It is obviously
impossible for plan participants to enforce their rights unless they are aware
that their rights have been violated.
15. S. Res. 35, § 4, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REC. Part 37 at 1681.
This resolution in fact continued prior S, Res. 360, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116
CONG. REC. Part 34 at 1315.
16. The Subcommittee on Labor, pursuant to the mandate of the Senate
Resolution, undertook as part of its comprehensive study a survey and
analysis of approximately 1500 private plans selected on the basis of a statis-
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Testimony by plan participants at legislative hearings con-
vinced members of the Subcommittee of the need for legisla-
tion in basically the same areas that had been found deficient
by the blue-ribbon Cabinet committee some six years previ-
ous, namely, vesting,1 7 portability,1 8 funding, 19 reinsurance20
and fiduciary standards. Plan participants indicated that
they sustained irreparable financial hardship at the time of
their termination of employment or retirement, realizing too
late that pension benefits on which they had relied did not
exist. Responsive testimony by plan administrators and
employers confirmed to a large degree the deficiencies, in-
adequacies and inequities described by employee-participants
in previous hearings. 2' The Subcommittee found that some
employers welcomed and suggested federal legislation in
tically-designed sampling technique from 3400 plans on file with the U. S.
Department of Labor. From the plans in the survey, two preliminary staff
analyses were conducted. The first, released on March 31, 1971, concerned
itself with the benefits and forfeitures in 87 of those private pension plans.
The analysis demonstrated that the number of employees in the 87 plans who
did not receive benefits or vested rights since 1950 greatly exceeded those
who did receive benefits or vested rights. The second staff analysis, released
on November 7, 1971, concerned itself with the amount of pension and re-
tirement benefits received in 764 plans during 1969-70-an average of less than
$100 a month. SENATE SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE COMM. ON LABOR AND
PUBLIC WELFARE, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE PRIVATE WELFARE AND
PENSION PLAN STUDY, S. Rep. 92-634, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. appendix (1971)
[hereinafter cited as PRELIMINARY REPORT].
17. Of the 21 witnesses testifying at the July 27, 28 and 29, 1971, hear-
ings, all of which were plan participants, 11 described forfeitures of pension
benefits which were directly attributable to inequitable vesting standards or
the lack of such in plans. Id. at 68. For a complete study of the vesting
provisions in effect in existing plans as found by the Subcommittee, see id. at
119.
18. The Subcommittee realized that the question on portability was com-
plex and would necessitate further government controls. It indicated that it
was aware of the problem and like the President's Cabinet Committee Report
discussed various alternatives but reaching no conclusions, recommended
further study. Id. at 73.
19. The Subcommittee unequivocally stated that "insufficient funding of
assets in pension plans presents an issue which warrants corrective legisla-
tive action." Id. at 72.
20. The establishment of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation in
ERISA was of course an outgrowth from the reinsurance discussions and
thinking of the Committee. Id. at 74, 81.
21. On October 12 and 13, 1971, the Subcommittee invited a select group
of employers and administrators to comment upon specific allegations and
testimony received in the July hearings. Sixteen witnesses testified at the
October hearing.
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order to achieve corrections. The testimony also established
that various investment practices, while not necessarily vio-
lating existing laws and though performed and undertaken
with the best of intentions, nevertheless did present certain
conflict of interest problems. For example, the Subcommittee
found that investment of substantial plan assets in employer
real estate or employer securities was a widespread prac-
tice .22
The Senate Subcommittee concluded, as had the blue-
ribbon Cabinet committee, that there was no single cen-
tralized governmental agency or regulatory body with super-
visory authority over private pension plans. Though eleven
federal departments and agencies had some authority and
responsibility in the pension area, it was apparent that only
two played a major role. 23
The Subcommittee recommended federal legislation re-
quiring improved disclosure and communication of plan pro-
visions to plan participants to be accomplished in part by
strengthening the disclosure requirements in existing legisla-
tion.24 It recommended a uniform standard of fiduciary re-
sponsibility and the centralization in one agency of all exist-
ing as well as prospective regulation of private pension plans,
to the maximum extent feasible.25
22. Though the Committee indicated that these practices do not neces-
sarily violate existing federal or state legislation and even though they are
performed with the best interests, nonetheless their potential can actually
jeopardize plan assets and may not serve the best interests of the plan
participants. PRELIMINARY REPORT at 86.
23. See id. at 91-99. The Committee sets forth an extensive discussion as
to the extent of supervisory regulation exercised by the federal government
over the administration and operations of private pension plans. The most
direct supervision was exercised by the Department of Labor through its
statutory requirements of plan disclosure and enforcement of certain federal
criminal statutes. The Treasury Department, which through the Internal
Revenue Service, is empowered to grant qualified status to pension plans and
thus guarantee certain tax advantages, played a minor role in the regulatory
process. See Lamon, Fiduciary Standards Under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, LAw NOTES, BARRISTER (Summer 1975).
24. Both the July and October hearings established that a frequent prob-
lem experienced by worker-participants is that they are furnished very little
information as to the administration and operation of their plan. The Sub-
committee found that workers are not adequately advised on conditions gov-
erning their eligibility for plan participation nor are they adequately advised
as to how pension benefits are and can be lost. PRELIMINARY REPORT at 112.
25. The Subcommittee specifically recommended "[a] uniform federal
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TYPE OF PLANS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF ERISA
A plan fiduciary of a plan subject to ERISA bears the
responsibility and potential liability imposed by the Act.
26
While ERISA contains four titles, the fiduciary provisions
are found mainly in Title 1.27 Since its coverage is all-
inclusive, its provisions are most important for present pur-
poses.
Title I applies to all "employee benefit plans," defined as
"employee welfare benefit plans," and "employee pension ben-
efit plans," or a combination of both.28 An "employee welfare
benefit plan" is any plan, fund or program providing certain
employee fringe benefits, such as medical, surgical, hospital
care, accident, disability, death, unemployment, vacation ben-
efits, apprenticeship or other training programs, day care
centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services.2 9 The
coverage is of such breadth that many employers may fail to
realize that their fringe benefit plans fall within the defini-
tion of an employee welfare plan.
An "employee pension benefit plan" is a fund, plan, or
program maintained by an employer or employee organiza-
tion for the purpose of providing retirement income to
employees or resulting in a deferral of income by employees
standard of fiduciary responsibility." Id. at 113. The Subcommittee indicated
that it faced two competing schools of thought: one advocated stringent
governmental controls, while the other, equally adamant in its position, re-
sisted any further regulation contending that plan flexibility would be im-
peded. It stated that plan participants must have the assurance that pension
benefits they have earned and come to rely upon will be available to them in
their retirement years. Similarly, it realized that employers need flexibility
in order to establish a pension program within the confines of their unique
and individual structures.
26. Of course, the Act imposes responsibility and potential liability upon
persons other than "fiduciaries," but the Act is only applicable to an
employee organization engaged in or affecting commerce maintaining an
"Employee Benefit Plan." ERISA §§ 4(a), 3(3).
27. Title I contains the labor provisions of ERISA while Title II contains
the Internal Revenue Service provisions. Title II is applicable only to "tax-
qualified plans" while Title I is much broader in coverage. It is applicable to
both "tax-qualified" and "non-tax-qualified" plans. "Tax-qualified" in com-
mon usage would mean a plan for which the employer will obtain a current
deduction for his contribution, while plan participants will not be taxed until
benefits are distributed to them and earnings accumulate tax-free in a qual-
ified pension trust.
28. ERISA § 3(3).
29. Id. § 3(1).
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for periods extending to the termination of covered employ-
ment or beyond.30 Any informal or formal program that de-
fers income or provides for post-employment income must be
closely scrutinized to see whether it falls within the confines
of the definition.
In order to fall within the definition of an employee pen-
sion benefit plan, there must be a plan, fund or program.
There need not exist a formal written plan embodied in a
document; the plan may be an informal arrangement between
the employer and employees. However, once the pension
rights are classified as an employee pension benefit plan, they
must be embodied in a written instrument.31 One commen-
tator has expressed the opinion that a single deferred com-
pensation agreement between an employer and an employee
would fall within the confines of the definition, though he
recognizes that the position could certainly be maintained
that such an agreement does not constitute a "plan. ' 32 But
whether several similar agreements can be said not to consti-
tute a plan is certainly open to question.
The plan, to be an employer pension benefit plan, must
defer or provide retirement income for employees. 33 Thus, a
plan for only self-employed individuals falls outside the scope
of the definition since there are no employees.3 4 Nor should an
agreement with an independent contractor, in that the indi-
vidual would not be classified as an employee. Furthermore,
the plan must defer income to termination of employment or
beyond. 35 Though no interpretive regulations have been is-
sued on this point, it would appear that a plan, fund or pro-
gram that defers income for a certain period of time, but which
deferral would under no circumstances extend to termination
of employment or beyond, is not within the Act's definition of
a pension plan.36
30. Id. § 3(2).
31. ERISA § 402(a)(1) requires that "[elvery employee benefit plan shall
be established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument."
32. Sollee, How the New Pension Reform Law Affects Non-Qualified De-
ferred Compensation Plans, 41 J. TAXATION 324 (1974).
33. ERISA § 3(2).
34. Id. § 3(2); Instructions to IRS Form 5500-K (Nov. 1975).
35. ERISA § 3(2)(B).
36. A plan which would defer income for a definite time period but in
which benefits would be payable to a participant only if he was in the active
employ of the employer at the end of that time period would in all likelihood
not fall within the definition.
[Vol. 36
ERISA: FIDUCIARY PROVISIONS
ERISA exempts certain types of employee benefit plans
from its coverage.3 7 Generally, governmental plans, church
plans, workmen's compensation plans, nonresident alien
plans, and unfunded excess benefit plans are exempt from the
Labor provisions of the Act. In addition, unfunded plans
maintained by an employer primarily for the purpose of pro-
viding deferred compensation for a select group of manage-
ment or highly compensated employees or agreements provid-
ing payments to retired or deceased partners, are exempt
from most of the substantive provisions of Title 1.38 In order
to come within the confines of the exemption a plan must be
established primarily for highly compensated or managerial
employees. No guidance is offered in the Committee Reports
as to the meaning of "select group of management" or "highly
compensated employees," terms that are not easily defin-
able.39 If the test is applied to a large corporation based on a
cardinal salary criterion, it would encompass a large group.
If, on the other hand, a percentage test were applied, say five
or ten percent of the most highly compensated corporate
employees, and if the corporation was small, in all likelihood
the group would include a number of modestly paid
employees. If a salary test were applied to a professional
corporation, such as a law firm, the group of highly compen-
sated employees would certainly include a great majority of
the employees. Regulations will have to be published before
any definitive answers can be given. Likewise, in order to
come within the exception, the plan must be "unfunded."
Again the Committee Reports offer no guidance in this area.
The only guidance is previous Internal Revenue Service Rul-
ings 40 shedding some light on the definition of "funded," but
37. ERISA § 4(b).
38. An exemption is provided under ERISA §§ 201(2), 301(a)(3), 401(a)(1)
and 4021(b)(6). See Rustigan, After the New Pension Law: Executive Compen-
sation and Non-Qualified Plans, 52 TAXES 896 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Rustigan]; Sollee, How the New Pension Reform Law Affects Non-Qualified
Deferred Compensation Plans, 41 J. TAXATION 324 (1974).
39. Rustigan indicates that "highly compensated" is broader than "select
group of management" in that this category should at least include all man-
agement personnel unless the corporation is arguably in such dire straits
that one could say that its management personnel is poorly compensated.
Rustigan at 899.
40. Rev. Rul. 72-25, 1972-1 CUM. BULL. 127; Rev. Rul. 68-99, 1968-1 CUM.
BULL. 193; Rev. Rul. 55-525, 1955-2 CUM. BULL. 543.
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there is no assurance that the Department of Labor will in-
corporate or adhere to them.4 1
Few plans, funds, or programs that provide employee
fringe benefits in any manner, shape, or form will fall outside
the definition of an employee welfare plan. Likewise, any
plan, fund, or program deferring income is suspect of being an
employee pension plan. The total exemptions from ERISA are
few and closely defined, and the partial exemptions are
fraught with danger and pitfalls.
DEFINITION OF A FIDUCIARY
A person is a "fiduciary" of an employee benefit plan to
the extent:
(i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretion-
ary control respecting management of such plan or
exercises any authority or control respecting manage-
ment or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders invest-
ment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or
indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of
such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so,
or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary
responsibility in the administrations of such plans. Such
term [also] includes any person designated . . . [by a
named fiduciary to carry out fiduciary responsibility]. 42
The definition first draws within its confines any person
authorized to amend, alter, or terminate an employee benefit
41. It appears that the Department of Labor will take a strict approach
to the definition of "unfunded," for a recently released regulation in its
preamble indicates that any segregation of assets by the employer will make
the plan funded, which goes beyond previous IRS rulings which apparently
required the transfer of assets beyond the reach of the general corporate
creditors in order to make the plan funded. Apparently the only safe course,
until clarifying Department of Labor Regulations are promulgated in this
area, would be to rely upon the pure naked promise of the employer. The
promulgated regulation also indicates that any employee contributions will
make the plan funded. Preamble, Dept. of Labor Regulation, § 2552.1 (De-
cember 19, 1974).
42. ERISA § 3(21)(A). A person is defined as an individual, partnership,
joint venture, corporation, mutual company, joint stock company, trust, es-
tate, unincorporated organization, association or employee organization.
ERISA § 3(9). See Overbeck, Persons upon Whom Duties and Obligations are
Imposed Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 52
TAXES 881 (1974).
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plan; thus, the employer, or plan sponsor, 43 is a fiduciary
under the Act. Because a corporation acts through its board
of directors, it is only natural to assume that board members
will also be plan fiduciaries with respect to the plan." A
recent Interpretive Release by the Department of Labor indi-
cates that board members are plan fiduciaries only to the
extent they have responsibility for any of the furnctions de-
scribed in the definition of fiduciary under § 3(21)(A). 45 The
Release indicates that if the board of directors has the re-
sponsibility for the selection and retention of plan fiduciaries,
board members would be deemed plan fiduciaries themselves,
though their responsibility and consequently their potential
liability would be limited to the selection or retention of plan
fiduciaries. In all likelihood it is very difficult to exclude the
board members as plan fiduciaries, in that their very position
usually connotes great authority in dealing with the plan.
The second part of the fiduciary definition includes any
person who exercises any authority or control respecting
management or disposition of plan assets. 46 A plan trustee,
presumed to have investment responsibility unless allocated
to a "named fiduciary" or "qualified investment manager,"
will be a plan fiduciary.47 If the investment responsibility has
been delegated to a "qualified irivestment manager" or a
named fiduciary, these persons will of course be plan
fiduciaries.
43. See Stafford, FIDUCIARIES AND PARTIES-IN-INTEREST UNDER
ERISA, at 68 (P.L.I. Tax Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 85);
Panel Discussion, Proceedings ABA National Institute, Fiduciary Respon-
sibilities under the Pension Reform Act, May 30 and 31, 1975, 31 THE Busi-
NESS LAWYER 85 (Special Issue 1975) [hereinafter cited as Panel Discussion].
44. For a complete discussion, see Panel Discussion at 86-98.
45. ERISA INTERP. BULL. 75-8, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 [hereinafter cited as
INTERP. BULL. 75-8].
46. H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 74-3 U.S.C.C. & A.N.
5103 (1974) [hereinafter cited as H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280] states that "the
substitute defines 'fiduciary' as any person who exercises any discretionary
authority or control respecting management of a plan, exercises any author-
ity or control respecting the management or disposition of its assets or has
any discretionary authority or responsibility in the administration of the
plan. Under this definition, fiduciaries include officers and directors of a plan,
members of a plan's investment committee and persons who select these
individuals. Consequently, the definition includes persons who have author-
ity and responsibility With respect to the matter in question, regardless of
their formal title."
47. ERISA §§ 402(a)(2), 3(38); H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5078-80.
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A person is a plan fiduciary if he renders investment
advice for a fee or other compensation or has the authority or
responsibility to do So.4 8 Proposed Regulations issued by the
Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service pro-
vide that a person "renders advice to a plan" if he makes
recommendations on purchasing or selling securities and if
he has discretionary authority or control with respect to the
investment of plan assets or provides advice to meet the
particular investment needs of the plan and it is expected
that such advice will serve as one of the primary bases for the
investment of plan assets.49 Apparently he need not render
the advice for a fee in order to be a plan fiduciary. But the
advice must be rendered on a regular basis with full know-
ledge that it will be used as the basis for the plan's invest-
ment decisions. 50
A person is a plan fiduciary if he has any discretionary
authority or responsibility for the administration of the plan.51
Each plan must designate a "named fiduciary" who is
charged with overall responsibility for the administration and
operation of the plan. 52 A "named fiduciary" is a fiduciary
named in the plan instrument or, pursuant to a procedure
specified in the plan, is identified as a fiduciary by a person
who is an employer or by an employee organization. 53 The
intent of this provision is to require the designation of some
individual or some entity in order to enable plan participants,
employees, or other interested parties to ascertain who is
responsible for the operation and administration of the plan.
The Department of Labor has taken the position that the
named fiduciary must be designated in the instrument, either
by name or by title.M There can, of course, be more than one
named fiduciary, and any one person may be a named
fiduciary with respect to a variety of plan responsibilities.
A "plan administrator" or "administrative committee" is
normally the designation given to the named fiduciary
charged with administrative responsibility. A person could
48. ERISA § 3(21)(A)(ii).
49. 26 C.F.R. § 54.4975-9.
50. Id.
51. ERISA § 3(21)(A)(iii).
52. Id. § 402(a)(1).
53. Id. § 402(a)(2).
54. ERISA INTERP. BULL. 75-5, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-5 [hereinafter cited as
INTERP. BULL. 75-5].
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become a fiduciary by accepting certain administrative plan
responsibility pursuant to a proper designation by a named
fiduciary. In order to become a plan fiduciary through the
assumption of administrative responsibility, the person must
assume discretionary authority. If the assumed responsibility
is nondiscretionary and ministerial, merely carrying into ef-
fect policies, interpretations, rules, practices and procedures
established by others, the person will not be a plan fidu-
ciary.55 In a similar vein, an attorney, accountant, actu-
tuary, or consultant who renders professional services other
than investment advice does not become a plan fiduciary by
virtue of his rendition. Advising plan fiduciaries or rendering
services to the plan does not normally involve the exercise of
any discretionary authority.56
The distinction between a "fiduciary" and a "named
fiduciary" is more than a matter of semantics. It can take on
extreme importance not only in the administration of the
plan but also in the accompanying responsibility and liability
associated with that administration. Only named fiduciaries
can allocate fiduciary responsibility among themselves and
only named fiduciaries can designate other persons to carry
out fiduciary responsibility.5 7 Only certain named fiduciaries
can appoint a qualified investment manager and only named
fiduciaries can direct the trustee as to investment decisions.58
BASIC FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES
A fiduciary is charged by ERISA with performing and
carrying out his plan duties and responsibilities solely in the
interest of the plan participants and their beneficiaries. 59 He
must discharge his duties for the exclusive purpose of provid-
ing plan benefits and defraying reasonable expenses of ad-
55. INTERP. BULL. 75-8.
56. Id. 75-5.
57. If the plan specifically allows allocation or delegation and provides a
procedure for it, named fiduciaries may allocate their specific responsibilities
among themselves and named fiduciaries may delegate all or part of their
duties (which do not involve asset management) to others. If such a proper
allocation and delegation has been undertaken the fiduciary will not be liable
for the acts or omissions of the persons to whom duties have been allocated or
delegated. H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5081.
58. An investment manager can be appointed only by a named fiduciary
charged with control or management of plan assets. ERISA § 402(c)(3).
59. ERISA § 404(a)(1).
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ministration." He must act with the care, skill, prudence, and
diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a
prudent man acting in like capacity and familiar with such
matters would use in conducting an enterprise of like charac-
ter and with like aims.6 1 This statutory definition is more
commonly referred to as the "prudent man rule." He must
diversify investments so as to minimize the risk of large loss-
es, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not
to do So. 6 2 He must act in accordance with the plan documents
and instruments insofar as they are consistent with the pro-
visions of ERISA.6 A fiduciary may not, unless authorized by
regulation, maintain plan assets outside the jurisdiction of
the United States,6 4 nor shall he engage in a "prohibited
transaction. ' '65
Unfortunately, the Committee Reports shed very little
light on the intended meaning and interpretation of the first
of the enumerated fiduciary duties. The obvious import is
that plan fiduciaries are to administer plans and discharge
their duties with a view toward benefiting the plan particip-
ants and their beneficiaries and not the employer. Their ac-
tions must, at all times, be directed towards that goal.
The second fiduciary charge, the exclusive purpose test,
originates from pre-ERISA Internal Revenue Service re-
quirements. 66 The exclusive purpose test had been inter-
preted by the Internal Revenue Service broadly and would
not appear to vary greatly from previous law.67
The fiduciary standard that has received the greatest
amount of notoriety and attention is the so-called "prudent
man rule." The standard is a federal standard and varies
from the traditional standard of fiduciary conduct in private
trust law. The "prudent man rule" must be interpreted by
taking into consideration the particular needs of employee
benefit plans. 68 The rule, of course, applies to all plan
60. Id. § 404(a)(1)(A)(i),(ii).
61. Id. § 404(a)(1)(B).
62. Id. § 404(a)(1)(C).
63. Id. § 404(aX)(D).
64. ld. § 404(b).
65. Id. § 406(a)(1).
66. See H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5082; Mittelman, The Exclusive
Benefit Rule and Diversification, 30 THE BUSINESS LAWYER 111 (1975).
67. Id.
68. H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5082; Klevan, Fiduciary Responsibility
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fiduciaries, but it would have different applications depending
on the fiduciary obligations that the fiduciary has assumed
under the plan.
The applicability of the "prudent man rule" in the in-
vestment area has received the greatest amount of attention.
The fiduciary charged with plan investment responsibility
may be required to guarantee an investment rate of return,
or the investment responsibility may be really nothing to
worry about. The truth, as with most extremes, lies some-
where in between. Traditional private trust investment
theories are not totally applicable in that most trustees are
charged with carrying out the wishes and dictates of the
settlor and generally have to consider both principal and in-
come beneficiaries in any investment strategy. Clearly, there
can be no one investment standard for all employee benefit
plans, and the standard will vary with the particular plan
needs and objectives. 69 The potential exposure for bad in-
vestments will also vary between different types of benefit
plans. In a defined benefit pension plan, in which the
employer bears the consequences of bad investments through
the amortization of investment losses, the potential fiduciary
liability for investments may not be great.7 0 In an individual
account plan, in which a participant's retirement benefits are
directly affected by the rate of investment return, the
fiduciary liability as to investments is greatly enhanced.7 1
A plan fiduciary is required to diversify plan assets, un-
less it is clearly prudent not to do so under the circumstances,
in order to minimize the risk of large losses. If a potential
claimant establishes that a plan fiduciary failed to diversify,
the burden of proof shifts to the fiduciary to establish that it
Under ERISA's Prudent Man Rule: What Are the Guideposts?, 44 J. TAXATION
152 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Klevan]; Williams, The Prudent Man Rule of
the Pension Reform Act of 1974, 31 THE BUSINESS LAWYER 99 (1975).
69. For excellent discussions of this area, see Comment, Fiduciary Stan-
dards and The Prudent Man Rule under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, 88 HARV. L. REV. at 969-73 (1975); Klevan, passim.
70. ERISA § 3(35) defines a "defined benefit pension plan" in the nega-
tive by defining it as other than an individual account plan, defined by
ERISA § 3(34). The employer is required to amortize bad investment losses
under § 302(b)(2)(B) over a 15 year period, or 20 years for multi-employer
plans.
71. The amount of retirement benefits available in an individual account
plan are directly attributable to employer contribution and the rate of return
on those contributions.
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was prudent not to do so under the circumstances. The degree
of investment concentration that would be in violation of this
standard is difficult to measure, but the Committee Reports
indicate that all facts and circumstances must be considered,
including the purpose of the plan, the amount of plan assets,
financial and industrial conditions, the type of investments,
distribution as to geographic location, distribution as to in-
dustries, and dates of maturity.72 A fiduciary generally should
not invest an unreasonably large proportion of the plan as-
sets in a single security, one type of industry, or in a particu-
lar geographical location. Investment of all or substantially
all of the plan assets in mutual funds, pooled investment
funds, insurance, or annuity contracts will not violate the
diversification requirements since these investment vehicles
are presumed to have a great amount of diversification. 73
A fiduciary is required to carry out his responsibilities in
accordance with the documents and instruments governing
the plan, if they are not contrary to ERISA. Since ERISA
requires that all employee benefit plans be maintained pur-
suant to a written instrument, the fiduciary does have gui-
dance and would be advised to adhere to the written word
unless it would contravene ERISA.
A fiduciary shall not cause the plan to engage in a "pro-
hibited transaction" with a "party in interest"; if he does, he
will be liable to the plan for its losses if he knows or should
have known that the transaction was prohibited. 74 If a
fiduciary enters into a "prohibited transaction" in his capa-
city other than as a fiduciary or enters into a transaction with
himself, he will subject himself to certain Internal Revenue
Service excise tax penalties. 75
72. H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5084-85.
73. Id. at 5085.
74. ERISA §§ 409(a), 406(a)(1). ERISA § 3(14) defines "[t]he term 'party-
in-interest' . . . [as] (A) any fiduciary including, but not limited to, any
administrator, officer, trustee, or custodian, counsel, or employer of such
employee benefit plan; (B) the person providing services to such plan; (C) an
employer any of whose employees who are covered by such plan; (D) an
employee organization any of whose members are covered by such plan'; (E)
any owner, direct or indirect, of 50 percent or more of-(i) the combined
voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or the total value of shares
of all classes of stock of a corporation, (ii) the capital interest or the profits
interest of a partnership, or (iii) the beneficial interest of a trust or unincor-
porated enterprise, which is an employer or employee organization described
in subparagraph (C) or (D) . .. ."
75. The definition of a "disqualified person" is almost identical to "a
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PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS
A fiduciary who engages in a prohibited transaction will
be personally liable for any plan losses or any profit made if
he knew or should have known the transaction was prohi-
bited.76 The tax provisions of ERISA set forth almost identi-
cal transactions in which a "disqualified person" may not
engage.77 A fiduciary acting solely as a plan fiduciary, though
coming within the definition of a "disqualified person," will
not be subject to an excise tax on the prohibited transaction.
But, if he engages in a transaction with the plan in other
than his fiduciary capacity, he will be deemed to be a disqual-
ified person and subject to the tax whether the transaction
was undertaken with or without knowledge that it was prohib-
ited. 78
The first prohibited transaction is a direct or indirect sale
or exchange or a leasing of any property between a plan and a
party-in-interest. 79  This provision also encompasses the
transfer of property subject to a mortgage that the party-in-
interest placed on the property within ten years from trans-
fer in order that the rule on sales cannot be circumvented by
party-in-interest," though the prior is the correct terminology under the
Internal Revenue Code, which defines it as a person who is "(A) a fiduciary;
(B) a person providing services to the plan; (C) an employer any of whose
employees are covered by the plan; (D) an employee organization any of
whose members are covered by the plan; (E) an owner, direct or indirect, of 50
percent or more of-(i) the combined voting power of all classes of stock
entitled to vote or the total value of shares of all classes of stock of a
corporation, (ii) the capital interest or the profits interest of a partnership, or
(iii) the beneficial interest of a trust or unincorporated enterprise, which is an
employer or employee organization described in subparagraph (C) or (D) . .. ."
INT. REV. CODE § 4975(e)(2). Although fiduciaries are disqualified persons
under the tax provisions, they are to be subject to the excise tax only if they
act in a prohibited transaction in a capacity other than that of a fiduciary. H.
Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5101-02.
76. ERISA §§ 406(a)(1), 409(a); H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5087.
77. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 4975(c)(1).
78. "Under the Labor provisions, a fiduciary will only be liable if he knew
or should have known that he engaged in a prohibited transaction. Such a
knowledge requirement is not included in the tax provisions. This distinction
conforms to the distinction in present law in the private foundation provi-
sions (where a foundation's manager generally is subject to a tax on self-
dealing if he acted with knowledge, but a disqualified person is subject to tax
without proof or knowledge)." H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5087.
79. ERISA § 406(a)(1)(A); H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5088. See GRAYCK,
PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS, FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY AND PROHIBITED
TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT
(P.L.I. Tax Law and Practice Course Handbooks Series No. 85).
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placing an encumbrance on the property and then transfer-
ring it to the plan. Apparently this provision would not
treat as a prohibited transaction an ordinary "blind pur-
chase" of securities through an exchange if neither the buyer
nor the seller knew the identity of the other party involved.
The second prohibited transaction is the direct or indirect
extension of credit or the lending of money between a plan
and a party-in-interest.8 0 Apparently this far-reaching section
would cover any transaction by which a party-in-interest
would receive an indirect benefit through the use of plan
assets. This provision may be somewhat troublesome in the
area of "soft dollars" in the brokerage industry, where the
employer, or a plan fiduciary, would have certain goods fur-
nished to him upon having the requisite number of brokerage
executions, even though those trades would be at best execu-
tions. Similarly, the funding of employer contributions with
debt instruments will probably be prohibited in that a liabil-
ity would exist between a party-in-interest and the plan. The
guaranteeing of plan borrowings by a party-in-interest would
constitute a prohibited transaction, unless it would come
within the special exemption granted for employee stock
ownership plans.81
The third prohibited transaction contained in both the
labor and Internal Revenue provisions is the direct or indi-
rect furnishing of goods or services or facilities between a
plan and a party-in-interest. 2 This provision also has far-
reaching implications in that it appears to prevent a party-
in-interest from deriving benefits from his relationship to the
plan. The Committee Report indicates that the furnishing of
personal living quarters to a party-in-interest is a prohibited
transaction . 3
A fiduciary also may not directly or indirectly transfer
any plan income or assets to or for the benefit of a party-in-
interest.8 4 The tax provisions use the wording "income or
assets" while the labor provisions use only "assets," yet the
legislative history establishes that both provisions should be
interpreted in the same manner, and both apply to income
and assets. The use of trust assets to manipulate the price of
80. ERISA § 406(a)(1)(B); H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5088.
81. Id. § 408(b)(3); H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5092-93.
82. Id. § 406(a)(1)(C); H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5089.
83. H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5089.
84. ERISA § 406(a)(1)(D); H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5089.
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employer securities would constitute a prohibited transac-
tion. This provision cannot always apply literally, since a
lump-sum distribution to a terminating participant, consi-
dered a party-in-interest, would violate its technical lan-
guage, but not its purpose.
A prohibited transaction found only in the labor provi-
sions and not the tax provisions is the prohibition against the
direct or indirect acquisition or holding by the plan of
employer securities or real property.85 But a plan may hold up
to 10% of its plan assets in employer securities and employer
real property. 6 A special exemption is provided for individual
account plans, i.e., profit sharing plans, stock bonus plans,
employee stock ownership plans, thrift or savings plans, and
certain money purchase plans. These individual account
plans may exceed the 10% limit if the plan specifies the per-
missible amount of employer securities or qualifying real
property that can be held by the plan.8 7
The labor and tax provisions treat a fiduciary's dealing
with the income or plan assets for his own interest or account
as a prohibited transaction. 8 The receipt of consideration for
the fiduciary's own personal account from any party dealing
with the plan in connection with a transaction involving the
income or assets of the plan constitutes a prohibited transac-
tion. These provisions fall within the so-called "multiple ser-
vices area."8 9 Interestingly, neither of these provisions may
apply to parties-in-interest or disqualified persons who are not
fiduciaries.9 0 They are designed to prevent inherent problems
85. Id. § 406(a)(1)(E); H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5089.
86. For the definition of "employer security," "employer real property,"
and "eligible individual account plan," see ERISA § 407(d).
87. For a complete discussion of these rules, see H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280
at 5097-98.
88. ERISA § 406(b)(1).
89. The phrase "multiple services" is not found in the statutory language
of ERISA but is discussed in the Committee report as a shorthand expression
in describing those situations in which a person acts on behalf of a plan in
several capacities.
90. H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5095 provides "[u]nless otherwise spec-
ifically allowed by statutory or administrative exemption, generally a
fiduciary is not to be able to provide 'multiple services' to a plan. However,
the prohibition against providing multiple services is not to apply to parties-
in-interest, who are not ,fiduciaries. This rule was adopted because of the
potential problems inherent in situations where persons who can act on
behalf of a plan also are in a position to personally benefit at the expense of
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when a person acts in a dual relationship to the plan and thus
is in a position personally to benefit at the expense of the plan
in carrying out his responsibility. In view of the fact that
these rules may not be applicable to fiduciaries, the definition
of fiduciary is a critical determination in the multiple service
area.
The multiple service problem is especially acute in the
insurance industry since a pension consultant may receive a
commission on the sale of insurance used to fund benefits
under the plan, and if the consultant is a plan fiduciary, the
commissions would violate the multiple service rules. On the
other hand, if he is not a plan fiduciary, but a party-in-
interest or a disqualified person, he could apparently provide
multiple services to the plan without violating the prohibited
transaction rules. Stockbrokers who provide investment
management services to a plan and at the same time furnish
brokerage services on a transaction which they direct en-
counter a similar problem.9 1 The structure obviously presents
an opportunity for churning of assets. If the stockbroker is a
plan fiduciary, he violates the multiple services rule. Broker-
dealers, reporting dealers, and banks benefit from an interim
exemption as to certain transactions that would otherwise be
prohibited. 92
The labor provisions of ERISA, though not the tax provi-
sions, prohibit a fiduciary from acting in any transaction in-
volving the plan on behalf of a person, or representing a party
with adverse interest to those of the plan or its participants.
The import of this provision is to prevent a plan fiduciary
from being placed in a position where he would have dual
loyalties and allegiances. 93
EXEMPTION FROM PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS
The exemptions from the prohibited transaction rules are
divided into two main parts. The first part, a general dis-
the plan in exercising that authority" (emphasis added). Though this is spec-
ifically set forth in the Conference Committee Report, it has been seriously
questioned. See Neal & Brett, ERISA Limitations on the Performance of
"Multiple Services" by Fiduciaries, 44 J. TAXATION 90 (1976).
91. H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5089-90.
92. See Proposed Exemptions from Prohibitions Respecting Certain Clas-
ses of Transactions involving Employee Benefit Plans and Certain Broker-
Dealers, Reporting Dealers and Banks, 40 Fed. Reg. No. 152 (August 6, 1975).
93. H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5089.
[Vol. 36
ERISA: FIDUCIARY PROVISIONS
cretionary procedure, requires the Secretary of Labor and the
Internal Revenue Service, respectively, to establish an
exemption procedure pursuant to which an exemption from
any of the prohibited transaction provisions can be sought.
The determination is to be a joint effort and the exemption
should be granted only if the respective departments find
that it is administratively feasible, is within the interest of
plan participants and their beneficiaries, and protects the
rights of participants and their beneficiaries.9 4 The area of
major activity has been in the investment area. There, the
Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service have
granted certain interim exemptions s 5
In addition, some transactions are generally exempt from
the prohibited transactions rules. For instance, the plan may
provide for loans to plan participants or their beneficiaries
under certain circumstances.9 6 The loans must be in accord
with specific plan provisions, and they must carry a reasona-
ble rate of interest and be adequately secured. They must be
made available to all plan participants on a nondiscrimina-
tory basis except as to credit-worthiness. 9 7 A party-in-interest
or a disqualified person may also furnish to a plan office
space, legal services, accounting services or other similar ser-
vices necessary for the establishment or operation of a benefit
plan, if no more than reasonable compensation is paid for
these services.9 8 The arrangements cannot be on a long-term
basis and must provide for termination on a reasonably short
notice, so that the plan will not be locked into a disadvan-
tageous long-term arrangement. Also, the plan may pay a
fiduciary or other party-in-interest reasonable compensation
for services rendered to the plan if the services are reasona-
bly necessary but only if the fiduciary or party-in-interest is
not receiving full-time pay from the employer or the sponsor-
ing association. It is permissible for the plan to reimburse
expenses properly and actually incurred by the fiduciary and
not otherwise reimbursed.9 9
Certain loans made to an employee stock ownership plan
94. ERISA § 408(a); INT. REv. CODE § 4975(c)(2); H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280
at 5091.
95. Prohibited Transaction Exemption 75-1, Dep't of Labor, IRS, 29
C.F.R. § 2509.75-10.
96. ERISA § 408(b)(1); H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5092.
97. Id.
98. ERISA § 408(b)(2); H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5092.
99. Id.
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(ESOP) are exempt.10 0 This exemption is necessary in order to
legitimate the common practice of these plans to purchase an
employer's stock from major shareholders or from the
employer itself; the proceeds to buy the stock are often ob-
tained from an unrelated lender with a guarantee of repay-
ment by the employer. Also, it is common practice for the
shareholder selling his stock to the ESOP to take back a note.
Since often the selling shareholder is a party-in-interest, such
a transaction, but for the exemption, would constitute a pro-
hibited transaction. This exception is available only to
employee stock ownership plans and not to other types of
employee benefit plans. 10 1
A bank or similar institution that is a plan fiduciary may
invest all or part of the plan assets in deposits with itself, if
those deposits bear a reasonable rate of interest and if the
plan covers only employees of the institution or if such in-
vestment is specifically authorized by a plan fiduciary (other
than the institution) or by the plan instrument itself.1 0 2
In addition the plan may purchase life insurance, health
insurance or annuities from the employer maintaining the
plan, if the employer is an insurance company qualified to do
business in a state or the District of Columbia. 0 3 The plan
may not pay more than adequate consideration for the insur-
ance.
Generally, a fiduciary is not able to provide multiple ser-
vices to a plan, but an exemption is provided for banks or
similar financial institutions that are supervised by the fed-
eral or state authorities under certain circumstances.104
First, the bank can charge no more than a reasonable rate
of compensation. It must establish adequate internal safe-
guards to assure that its provision of ancillary services is
in accord with sound banking and financial practices, as de-
termined by federal and state banking authorities. The ser-
vices must be provided in accordance with binding, specific
100. ERISA § 408(b)(3); H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5092-93. See the H.
Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5093 for a discussion as to the anticipated parame-
ters of an employee stock ownership plan; see also Hoggert, Employee Stock
Ownership Trusts, 53 TAXES 305 (1975); Kaplan, Esop's Fable, 53 TAXES 898
(1975).
101. ERISA § 408(b)(3); H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5093.
102. Id. § 408(b)(4); H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5094.
103. Id. § 408(b)(5); H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5094.
104. Id. § 408(b)(6); H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5095.
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guidelines that will prevent the bank from providing ancillary
services in an unreasonable or excessive manner or that
would violate the best interests of the plan participants or
their beneficiaries.
Certain employee benefit plans may hold or acquire
employer securities. Since some of these securities may be
convertible, bonds to stocks, a conversion is not a prohibited
transaction if the plan receives at least fair market value
under the conversion. 10 5 Of course, the conversion must be
reasonable under the circumstances, and in keeping with the
interest of the plan participants and their beneficiaries.
Banks, trust companies, and insurance companies may
maintain pooled investment funds for plans.'0 6 In order to
come within this exception, the plan instrument or a plan
fiduciary who has the authority to manage and control the
plan assets must specifically authorize the investment of plan
assets in the fiduciary's own sponsored pooled investment
fund. 107
Finally, an overriding exemption is provided for the dis-
tribution of plan assets in accordance with the applicable
rules of ERISA or in accordance with the terms of the plan
instrument. 0 8
CIVIL LIABILITY
Under the labor provisions of ERISA, any fiduciary who
breaches his fiduciary responsibility will be personally liable
for any losses to the plan resulting from the breach and for
restoring to the plan any profits he may have made through
the breach. 0 9 The tax provisions impose nondeductible excise
taxes on disqualified persons but not on fiduciaries unless
acting in a capacity other than that of a fiduciary, for enter-
ing into certain prohibited transactions." '0 There are, of
course, many specific penalties imposed upon a plan fiduciary
for failing to carry out certain mandatory administrative plan
responsibilities.
Generally, while a fiduciary is not liable for any breach of
105. Id. § 408(b)(7); H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1.280 at 5095-96.
106. Id. § 408(b)(8); H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1.280 at 5096.
107. Id. § 408(b)(8); H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5096.
108. Id. § 408(b)(9); H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1.280 at 5097.
109. Id. § 409(a).
110. See notes 74-75, supra.
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fiduciary responsibility that occurred before he became a plan
fiduciary or after he no longer holds such a plan position,"'
he is subject to appropriate actions that may be brought
against him, including his removal from a fiduciary position.
Plan participants, beneficiaries, or the Department of Labor
may enforce his duties. 1 12 An action to enforce a breach of
fiduciary responsibility or an action to enforce or clarify ben-
efit rights under the labor provisions lies exclusively in the
United States district courts. Suits to enforce benefit rights
or to recover benefits under the plan that do not involve
application of the labor provisions of ERISA may be brought
not only in the federal district courts but also in state courts
of competent jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, if appropriate, lies in
federal district courts without regard to the amount in con-
troversy or citizenship of the parties.
In any court action, the court may allow reasonable at-
torney's fees or other costs to either party. If a participant or
a beneficiary initiates an action in a federal district court to
enforce his rights under the labor provisions of ERISA, he
must provide a copy of the complaint to the Secretaries of
Labor and Treasury. 1 3 A copy of the complaint is not re-
quired in an action solely for the purpose of recovering be-
nefits under the plan. The Secretaries of Labor and Treasury
both may intervene in any action at their discretion.
1 14
In addition to the numerous redresses available to pri-
vate litigants and the ability of the Secretaries of Labor and
Treasury to intervene, the Act authorizes the Secretary of
Labor to seek an injunction for breach of fiduciary duty to
enjoin any action or practice by a plan fiduciary that violates
the labor provisions or to obtain other appropriate relief or to
enforce any provision of the labor provisions of ERISA. In
addition, the Secretary of Labor may assess upon a party-in-
interest civil penalties, analogous to the excise tax penalties
found under the tax provisions, with respect to the non-tax-
qualified plans where there has been a prohibited transac-
tion.1"5
111. ERISA § 409(b).
112. See ERISA § 502; H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5106-07.
113. A suit to enforce benefit rights under a plan that does not involve
the labor provisions of ERISA may be brought in a state court of competent
jurisdiction. ERISA § 502(e)(1).
114. Id. § 502(h).
115. Id. § 502(i).
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The Secretary of Labor has broad authority and power to
investigate potential violations of fiduciary duties. He can
request the submission of reports, books and records but he
cannot request them more than once a year. He is given
subpoena powers identical to those available to the Federal
Trade Commission in order to enforce his investigatory
role. 116
Generally, no action may be commenced under the labor
provisions as to a breach of fiduciary's responsibility, duty or
obligation after the earlier of six years after the date of the
last action which constituted a part of such breach or viola-
tion or, in the case of an omission, the latest date in which the
fiduciary could have cured the breach or violation, or three
years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual
knowledge of the breach or violation or in which a report from
which he could have reasonably expected to have obtained
such knowledge of such breach or violation was filed with the
Secretary of Labor.,
Co-FIDUCIARY LIABILITY
A plan fiduciary is personally liable for any loss caused by
a breach of fiduciary responsibility by another fiduciary
under certain specified circumstances. If a fiduciary know-
ingly participates in or knowingly undertakes to conceal an
act or omission of a co-fiduciary which he knows constitutes a
breach, liability will be imposed upon him.1 7 If A and B are
co-trustees and the terms of the trust provide that they are
not to invest in commodity futures, and A suggests to B that
B invest part of the plan assets in commodity futures, if B
does so, A, as well as B, is liable for the breach. If a plan
fiduciary knowingly conceals a breach of fiduciary obligation
committed by another plan fiduciary, he will be liable. As-
sume A and B are co-trustees, and B invests in commodity
futures in violation of the trust instrument. If B tells his
co-trustee A of this investment, A would be liable with B for
breach of fiduciary responsibility if he conceals this invest-
ment."18
A fiduciary is also liable if he knows that another
116. See id. § 504.
117. Id. § 405(a)(1).
118. H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5080.
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fiduciary of the plan has committed a breach and he does not
take reasonable steps under the circumstances to remedy
it.119 In the above examples the fiduciary gaining knowledge
of the breach of responsibility by the co-fiduciary may be
required to dispose of the commodity futures if he has the
authority to do so and if it would be prudent under the cir-
cumstances. Alternatively, the appropriate step may be to
notify the plan sponsor of the breach, to proceed in the ap-
propriate federal court for instruction or to bring the matter
to the attention of the Secretary of Labor. The proper remedy
required under the facts and circumstances will vary, of
course, with each individual case, but apparently the
fiduciary must take some form of affirmative action to at-
tempt to remedy the breach to avoid liability. 12 0
A fiduciary is liable for the loss caused to the plan by the
breach of fiduciary responsibility of another fiduciary if he
has enabled the other fiduciary to commit a breach through
his failure to exercise prudence or to comply with the basic
fiduciary rules of the labor provisions in carrying out his
specific responsibility. 121 If A and B are co-trustees to jointly
manage the plan assets, and if A improperly allows B to have
sole custody of the plan assets and makes no inquiry as to his
conduct, while B is thereby enabled to sell the property and to
embezzle the proceeds, A is liable for a breach of fiduciary
responsibility.1 22
ALLOCATION OF FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY
ERISA clearly allows plan fiduciaries to allocate fiduciary
responsibility among themselves. The plan must specifically
allow allocation or delegation and must expressly provide a
procedure for it.123 A proper allocation or delegation of re-
sponsibility also allocates or delegates the fiduciary liability;
of course, the co-fiduciary liability rules still apply. 124
If plan assets are held by one trustee, it is assumed that
the trustee has sole and absolute authority to manage and
control the plan assets unless the authority has been dele-
119. ERISA § 405(a)(2).
120. Id.; H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5085-86.
121. ERISA § 405(a)(3).
122. H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5080.
123. ERISA § 402(b)(2).
124. Id. § 405(c)(1); H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5081-82.
[Vol. 36
ERISA: FIDUCIARY PROVISIONS
gated or allocated to a named plan fiduciary or to a qualified
investment manager. If the plan provides for two or more
trustees, they jointly have the responsibility for the man-
agement and control of plan assets,'125 but the trust instru-
ment can provide for an allocation and delegation of trust
responsibility among various trustees. If so, a trustee will not
be liable for any losses that arise from acts or omissions of the
co-trustee to whom the responsibilities have been allocated.
Though a trustee is not liable for the actions of a co-trustee
under these circumstances, a co-trustee will be liable not-
withstanding if he fails to comply with other applicable
fiduciary standards. 126 If plan assets are held in separate
trusts, the trustee of one trust is not responsible as a co-
trustee of another trust.
Though it is presumed that a trustee will have invest-
ment authority with respect to plan assets, it is possible to
structure the plan instruments so that the trustee will be
subject to the proper direction of a named fiduciary who is not
a trustee. The plan instrument must specifically provide for
this and the trustee will, under such a structure, subject
himself to potential co-fiduciary liability for investment deci-
sions.127
In addition, the plan may permit individual participants
to exercise independent control over the investment of plan
assets in their own individual accounts.128 If so, they are not
plan fiduciaries, and plan fiduciaries will not be liable for any
investment loss resulting from the directed investment deci-
sions of the plan participants. 29
DELEGATION OF INVESTMENT RESPONSIBILITY
The major area of potential liability under ERISA ac-
companies investment responsibility for plan assets. A plan
fiduciary charged with investment responsibility is not in any
manner guaranteeing an investment rate of return, though
he should not treat his responsibility with a cavalier attitude.
He will be held to a certain conduct of prudence judged by
125. Id. § 405(b)(1); H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5080.
126. H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5081.
127. The trustee will be subject to the co-fiduciary provisions of ERISA §
405(a).
128. ERISA § 404(c).
129. Id.; H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5085-86.
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varying degrees, depending on the expertise he professes to
have. In view of these potentially onerous provisions, much
attention should be given to the proper allocation of invest-
ment responsibility among plan fiduciaries and the structur-
ing of the plan instrument in such a way as to clearly dele-
gate and isolate this potential liability.
A named fiduciary with respect to the control and man-
agement of plan assets may appoint a qualified investment
manager to manage all or part of the plan assets, but there is
some confusion under the Act whether a plan trustee is a
"named fiduciary" and thus able to appoint a qualified in-
vestment manager. The named fiduciary, in choosing and re-
taining an investment manager, does have fiduciary respon-
sibility to oversee his performance. If he appoints a qualified
investment manager, he no longer has responsibility for
managing the assets controlled by the qualified investment
manager and would, generally, not be liable 'for the acts or
omissions of the investment manager. He would only be liable
if he knowingly participated in or knowingly undertook to
conceal an act or omission by the investment manager that
he knew constituted a breach of fiduciary responsibility. 130 In
contrast, if a trustee is subject to the direction of a named
fiduciary as to investment decisions, his co-fiduciary liability
would be more extensive. 13 1
If plan assets are held in one or more separate trusts or
distinct portions of one trust, each trustee is charged only
with investment responsibility and potential liability as to
plan assets contained in that trust. The potential liability
here is closely akin to the appointment of a qualified invest-
ment manager. If, on the other hand, one trust instrument is
used with several co-trustees, even though the instrument
specifically provides for the allocation of trust responsibilities
among the co-trustees, a trustee is subject to the general
co-fiduciary liability provisions of ERISA.'132
130. ERISA § 405(d)(1). This section would limit co-fiduciary liability to §
405(a)(1).
131. Under this structure all of the co-fiduciary liability provisions of §
405(a) are applicable. The trustee is relieved of liability under § 403(a)(1) upon
following "proper directions of such fiduciary which are made in accordance
with the terms of the plan and which are not contrary to this title .... " In view of
this distinction, it generally is not advisable for banks to assume the position of
trustee and be subject to directed investments by a named fiduciary.
132. H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5081.
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If a plan provides for individual accounts and permits the
plan participants to make their own investment decisions and
such decisions are exercised truly on an independent basis,
little or no potential investment liability exists. If a plan
instrument provides that the trustee is subject to the direc-
tion of a named fiduciary as to investment decisions, the
trustee is not liable for following his proper directions made
in accordance with the terms of the plan and consistent with
the labor provisions of ERISA. Under this structure, the
trustee has more exposure under the co-fiduciary liability
provisions in that he is subject to ascertaining whether the
decisions by the named fiduciary are made in accordance with
the terms of the plan and are not contrary to the provisions of
ERISA. If a trustee is charged with investment responsibility
and retains an investment advisor, differentiating between
an investment advisor and a qualified investment manager,
the trustee has not relieved himself of investment liability
and the investment manager will probably be deemed a plan
fiduciary.
As can be seen from the above, a great variety of struc-
tures can be undertaken, some shifting and obligating in-
vestment responsibility and potential liability, others only
adding additional plan fiduciaries to that responsibility and
liability. It is imperative to understand that various struc-
tures will have varying degrees of protection in absolving a
fiduciary of potential fiduciary liability.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Exculpatory Provisions
Any exculpatory language that attempts to relieve a
fiduciary from liability for breach of his responsibility is
void. 133 Though exculpatory clauses are invalid, the Depart-
ment of Labor has recognized the validity of indemnification
agreements given to a plan fiduciary by an employer or a plan
sponsor. 134 A plan may also purchase insurance to protect
itself against any loss resulting out of a breach of fiduciary
responsibility, although the insurance purchased by the plan
133. ERISA § 410(a).
134. ERISA INTERP. BULL. 75-4 (June 4, 1975), 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-4.
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must allow recourse by the insurer against the fiduciary. 135 A
fiduciary can also purchase insurance to protect himself
against potential liability arising out of a breach of his
fiduciary duties or his employer can purchase such for him. 136
The Department of Labor has issued an Interpretative Bulle-
tin validating a common practice by which a plan takes out
insurance and part of the insurance policy is a waiver of
recourse by the insurer as against the plan fiduciary, but the
premium for the waiver of recourse must be paid by the plan
fiduciary. 137
Bonding Provisions
Every plan fiduciary, and other persons who handle funds
or fund property, jointly called plan officials, must be
bonded.' 38 This provision is identical to an analogous provi-
sion in the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act, 139 and
Congress intended that it be given a similar interpretation. 140
A bond is not required if plan benefits are paid solely from the
assets of the employer or union nor is it required of a domes-
tic trust or insurance corporation subject to federal supervi-
sion or examination, if the trust or corporation has capital
and surplus in excess of $1 million.
Prohibition Against Certain Persons Holding Offices
Persons who have been convicted of certain specified
crimes may not serve as plan administrators, fiduciaries,
officers, trustees, custodian counsel, agents, employees or
consultants of the plan for five years after conviction or five
years after the end of imprisonment, whichever is later.' 4'
Such a person may serve in any one of the above capacities if
his citizenship rights have been fully restored or if the United
States Board of Parole determines that his services would not
be contrary to the purposes of the labor provisions of ERISA.
Rather stringent penalties are provided for violating this sec-
135. ERISA § 410(b)(1).
136. Id. § 410(b)(2), (3).
137. Dept. of Labor News Release (Mar. 4, 1975).
138. ERISA § 412; H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5104.
139. H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5104.
140. Id.
141. ERISA § 411; H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 5104.
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tion; those who intentionally violate the provision may be
fined up to $10,000 and imprisoned for up to one year.
CONCLUSION
ERISA is having and will continue to have a major im-
pact on employee benefit plans. The fiduciary provisions of
the Act will in their fullest measure only be felt, understood,
hated or appreciated with the passage of time.

